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Abstract
The behaviour of norm-autonomous agents is determined by their goals and the
norms that are explicitly represented inside their minds. Thus, they require
mechanisms for acquiring and accepting norms, determining when norms are
relevant to their case, and making decisions about norm compliance. Up un-
til now the existing proposals on norm-autonomous agents assume that agents
interact within a deterministic environment that is certainly perceived. In prac-
tice, agents interact by means of sensors and actuators under uncertainty with
non-deterministic and dynamic environments. Therefore, the existing propos-
als are unsuitable or, even, useless to be applied when agents have a physical
presence in some real-world environment. In response to this problem we have
developed the n-BDI architecture. In this paper, we propose a multi -context
graded BDI architecture (called n-BDI) that models norm-autonomous agents
able to deal with uncertainty in dynamic environments. The n-BDI architecture
has been experimentally evaluated and the results are shown in this paper.
Keywords: Norms, Uncertainty, Graded BDI agents
1. Introduction
The first approaches on norms inside the multi-agent system (MAS) field
assumed that agents have a physical presence in closed and relatively static en-
vironments where agents cooperate to achieve a common objective. For this rea-
son, these first proposals were focused on hard-coding norms on agents. Later,
the interest switched from such closed systems to open and dynamic systems
in which heterogeneous and autonomous agents coexist. Norm-programmed
agents are unsuitable for these systems because of two main reasons [21]: the
circumstances might change, which makes the programmed norms obsolete; and
agents may interact with agents that follow different norms. In this situation, ex-
plicit representations of norms can support appropriate, more flexible, reasoning.
Thus, there was a shift from norm-programmed agents into norm-autonomous
agents.
In [16] a norm-autonomous agent is defined as an agent whose behaviour
is influenced by norms that are explicitly represented inside its mind. Agents
with an explicit representation of norms are able to participate in different
societies (in which different norms may apply), to communicate norms and
to reason about them [33]. Norm-autonomous agents require capabilities for
acquiring norms; i.e., agents should be capable of recognising the norms that
are in force in their environment [4]. Moreover, agents can have motivations to
accept these recognised norms [33]. For example, a norm can be rejected when
the majority of agents in the MAS do not consider it as important. Besides that,
norm-autonomous agents need to be endowed with capabilities for determining
whether a norm concerns their case and it is relevant [31]. Once the recognised
norm has been accepted and considered as relevant, then agents must decide
whether or not to conform to it. This decision about obeying or violating a
norm is known as norm compliance decision [33].
Up until now, the majority of the existing proposals on norm-autonomous
agents, such as [10] and [4], assume that agents interact within a deterministic
environment that certainly perceived. As a consequence, they propose rigid and
static procedures, such as utility functions, for reasoning about norms. Thus,
these proposals assume that it is possible to define off-line which the best de-
cision in all circumstances is. It entails a limitation on the agent capacities for
adapting to new societies or to the environmental changes. The development
of dynamic mechanisms for allowing agents to reason about norms according to
current circumstances has received little attention [33]. Moreover, these propos-
als assume that agents are situated within an environment that can be perceived
by agents with complete precision. In practice, agents interact by means of sen-
sors and actuators under uncertainty with a non-deterministic environment.
Therefore, the existing solutions are unsuitable to be applied in real applica-
tions. To address this problem, we propose here to endow norm-autonomous
agents with declarative and flexible procedures for reasoning about norms under
uncertainty within dynamic environments.
Specifically, in this paper we propose a new architecture for norm-autonomous
agents. This architecture, named as n-BDI, is an expansion of a multi-context
graded BDI architecture [12] with explicit normative notions. Thus, our agents
have a more precise representation of the uncertainty and the norms that regu-
late this environment. Moreover, agents use declarative procedures that adapt
to different personality traits depending on the cognitive elements present in
the agent theory. Thereby, our agents are able to achieve a better adaptation to
dynamic environments. To demonstrate this we will use them a fire-rescue case
study. Specifically, we seek to determine whether the fact that our agents have
an explicit representation of the uncertainty and that they use expressive and
flexible rules to reason about norms allow them to achieve a better adaptation
to the environment.
This article is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce the
fire rescue case study and the basic notions used in this paper. In Section 3
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we propose the n-BDI architecture. Sections 4 and 5 describe the two main
components of the n-BDI architecture. Section 6 describes how n-BDI agents
make decisions about norm compliance. Section 7 contains the evaluation of
the n-BDI architecture. We make a review of related work in Section 8. Finally,
Section 9 contains conclusions of this paper.
2. Background
2.1. Case Study
As aforementioned, we will use in this paper a fire-rescue case study to: (i)
illustrate how a n-BDI agent reasons about norms under uncertainty within a
dynamic environment; and (ii) evaluate if our agents achieve better results in
such kind of situations. In the fire-rescue case study we consider two different
types of persons: a fireman1 and victims that must be rescued. Victims are
located in a building in flames. Since they are not endowed with flame-proof
clothes they wait until they are rescued by a fireman who leads victims to
the door of the building. The fireman dies when there is not any path that
allows him to reach the door. There are norms that define general patterns
that firemen must follow when dealing with fire threats. Specifically, we assume
the existence of a norm that obliges firemen to abort the fire-rescue operation
when it is taking too much risk. This is a simple scenario controlled by a
single norm that becomes relevant under circumstances that are uncertain (i.e.,
a risky situation). Moreover, the fireman cannot be sure of the repercussions of
violating or obeying the norm. Finally, the environment (i.e., the building design
and the position of victims) may change from fire-rescue to fire-rescue. Thus,
decision making procedures that allow firemen to make decisions in unforeseen
fire-rescue scenarios are required.
2.2. Multi-context Graded BDI Architecture
A norm-autonomous agent is defined in this paper as a practical reason-
ing agent [14] whose actions are directed towards its internal goals and the
norms that regulate its environment. Specifically, this paper focuses on how
a norm-autonomous agent reasons about norms under uncertainty within dy-
namic environments. To make such kind of decisions a norm-autonomous agent
considers its current circumstances; i.e., the beliefs about the world in which
the agent is placed; and its objectives or the situations that the agent wants
to accomplish or bring about; i.e., the agent desires. For these reasons, in this
paper we endow BDI agents with capabilities for considering norms in their
decisions. The feature that distinguishes norm-autonomous BDI agents from
classic BDI agents is the availability of an explicit representation of norms and
instances and the capabilities for reasoning about them. It serves this purpose
well to address different mental attitudes in a modular way, and for that reason
we rely on multi-context systems for the formalisation of those attitudes [26, 9].
1For simplicity, we assume that only one fireman participates in the fire-rescue operation.
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The main intuition beyond multi-context systems is that reasoning is usually
performed on a subset of the global knowledge base. Each one of these subsets
is a context. Informally, a context contains a partial theory of the world which
encodes the agent’s perspective about this part of the world. Let be I a set of
indexes, a multi-context system is defined by a set of interconnected contexts
〈{Ci}i∈I ,∆〉. Each context has inference routines used to reason about it [25].
Formally, each context ci ∈ {Ci}i∈I is a tuple 〈Li,Ai,∆i〉, where Li, Ai and ∆i
are the language, axioms and inference rules defining the logic of each context,
respectively. Moreover, the reasoning in one context may affect reasoning in
other contexts. Specifically, ∆ is the set of bridge rules between the contexts;
i.e., inference rules whose premises and conclusions belong to different contexts:
C1 : A1, ..., Cq : Aq
Cj : A
meaning that if for all k ∈ {1, ..., q} Ak is deduced in context Ck, then A
is inferred in Cj . Thus, the top of any bridge rule is the precondition (i.e., the
formulas that must hold to apply the bridge rule) and the bottom of the bridge
rule is the postcondition (i.e., the formula that is generated within a context).
Because we want our agents to contend with uncertainty, we will assume
graded logics. As a consequence, in this article we endow multi-context graded
BDI agents, proposed by Casali et al. in [12], with capabilities for considering
explicit normative notions in their decisions. As proposed by Casali et al., a
multi-context graded BDI agent has mental contexts to characterise graded be-
liefs (BC), intentions (IC), and desires (DC). All these contexts contain weighted
expressions that represent the degree of certainty, desirability, or intentionality
of mental attitudes:
• Belief Context (BC). It is formed by expressions belonging to the BC-
Logic, which was defined by Casali et al. in [12]. The language LBC is
defined over a classical propositional language LP (built from a countable
set of propositional variables with connectives→ and ¬) which is expanded
with a fuzzy modal operator B. Thus, the BC contains logic propositions
such as (B γ, ρ); where B γ represents a belief about proposition γ ∈ LP ,
and ρ ∈ [0, 1] represents the certainty degree associated to this belief. The
logical connective→ is used to represent explanation relationships between
propositions. Thus, (B α→ β, ρ) represents that the agent believes that α
explains β, with a certainty degree ρ; i.e., the agent believes the probability
α causes β is ρ.
• Desire Context (DC). In the original proposal of Casali et al. [12] a many
value modal logic to represent and reason about agent bipolar preferences
(i.e., positive and negative desires) is defined. For the purpose of this
article, we just require a single fuzzy modal operator D for representing
desires. Thus, the DC contains logic propositions such as (D γ, ρ); where
D γ represents a desire about proposition γ ∈ LP , and ρ ∈ [0, 1] represents
the desirability degree. Thus, negative desires are represented using the
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negation connective ¬ (i.e., (D ¬γ, ρ)). Degrees of desires allow setting
different levels of preference or rejection.
• Intention Context (IC). It is formed by expressions belonging to the IC-
Logic [12]. Thus, it is formed by graded intentions that are denoted by
(Iγ, ρ), where ρ ∈ [0, 1] may be considered as the truth degree of the
expression “γ is intended through the best plan to reach γ”. Thus, the
intentionality degree of a proposition γ must be the consequence of finding
a best feasible plan that permits a state of the world where γ holds to be
achieved.
The logic of mental contexts is a mixture of first-order modal logic [44], which
is employed to represent those propositions that are believed, desired, or in-
tended; and Rational Pavelka Logic (RPL) [39] to represent the probability of
propositions. Therefore, the axioms and rules are built by considering axioms of
first-order predicate logic and axioms of RPL2. Deduction rules for each context
are Modus Ponens and Necessitation for the mental modalities B,D, I. For a
complete description of these contexts see [12].
In the proposed case study, the theory of the fireman agent is formed by:
• Graded beliefs that represent its beliefs about environment in which it is
situated: e.g., its perceptions. For example, it has beliefs about the fire
condition or the victims that are situated in its surroundings. Moreover,
the fireman knows explanation relationships between beliefs. These rela-
tionships allow the firemen agent to represent the potential consequences
of actions or states. For example, the fireman agent knows its survival
probability if it aborts the rescue. It also knows the probability of saving
one more victim if it continues with the rescue.
• Graded desires that represent the agent preferences; i.e., its intrinsic goals.
The fireman has desires that represent how much it wants to protect its
own life and how much it wants to preserve victims’ life..
• Graded Intentions that represent the deliberative state of the agent. Specif-
ically, the fireman knows plans for aborting the rescue and plans for carry-
ing on the rescue. Thus, the fireman agent can generate intentions on-line
to abort the rescue and to continue with the rescue depending on its cir-
cumstances (i.e., its beliefs and desires).
Let us suppose that there is a fireman working in a specific building (gateHouse).
Table 1 shows an example of the fireman beliefs, desires and intentions (see
rows corresponding to contexts BC,DC and IC) at a given moment of the
rescue. Specifically, the fireman agent believes that the situation is somehow
risky —(B risky(gateHouse), 0.5). It also believes that it has 50% probability
2RPL is an extension of Lukasiewicz’s infinitely-valued logic by expanding its language
with rational truth-constants to explicitly reason about degrees of truth [29].
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of survival if it aborts the rescue —(B abort(gateHouse)→ survive(self), 0.5).
Since the closest victim is quite far from the fireman position, it believes that it
has low probabilities of saving one more victim if it continues with the rescue —
(B ¬abort(gateHouse)→ survive(victims), 0.25). The rest of beliefs can be ig-
nored at this moment. This fireman considers equally important the lives of the
victims and its own life; i.e., it desires the survival of victims and itself with the
highest desirability —(D survive(victims), 1) and (D survive(self), 1). Finally,
it has an intention to continue with the rescue —(I continue(gateHouse), 1).
Context Content
(B risky(gateHouse), 0.5)
(B abort(gateHouse)→ survive(self), 0.5)
(B ¬abort(gateHouse)→ survive(victims), 0.25)
BC (B play(self, fireman), 1)
(B inform(expert1, norm(nfireAbortion) ∧ salience(0.75)), 1)
(B inform(expert2, norm(nfireAbortion) ∧ salience(0.2)), 1)
(B inform(expert3, norm(nfireAbortion) ∧ salience(0.8)), 1)
DC (D survive(victims), 1), (D survive(self), 1)
IC (I continue(gateHouse), 1)
NAC normOpinion(nfireAbortion, expert1, 0.75),
normOpinion(nfireAbortion, expert2, 0.2),
normOpinion(nfireAbortion, expert3, 0.8),
norm(nfireAbortion, 0.64)
NRC instance(ifireAbortion, 0.32)
Table 1: Theory of the fireman agent (using the n-BDI architecture)
The reasoning process in a multi-context graded BDI agent is mainly per-
formed by bridge rules that connect mental contexts. Thus, the information
flows from perception to action via bridge rules that define how the information
that is represented inside several contexts is combined for inferring new infor-
mation in other contexts. The reasoning process can be summarised into three
different phases. In the first one, the agent perceptions are used for updating
the agent knowledge. In the second phase, desires are updated. In the third
phase, the agent makes a decision about the next action to be performed.
Phase 1. Perception. The agent perceives the environment and trans-
lates this perception into new formulae that are inserted in those contexts
that are responsible for representing the agent environment. The per-
ception process is illustrated in Figure 1(a) (see the white circle and the
white box). This image shows how the different contexts (i.e., circles)
are connected by means of bridge rules (i.e., boxes). Specifically, the be-
lief revision bridge rules change beliefs to take into account new pieces of
information.
Phase 2. Deliberation. In this phase desires that represent the mo-
tivations of agents are updated (see the white circles and the white box
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of Figure 1(b)). Specifically, the option generation bridge rules determine
the options available to the agent (its desires) on the basis of its current
beliefs about its environment and its current intentions.
Phase 3. Decision Making. The intention filter bridge rules deter-
mine the agents intentions on the basis of its current beliefs, desires, and
intentions. Finally, the action selection bridge rules determine an action
to perform on the basis of current intentions. An overview of the decision
making phase is illustrated in Figure 1(c).
Belief Revision
Bridge Rules
Environment
BC
Norm Acquisition
Bridge Rules
NAC
Norm Relevance
Bridge Rules
NRC
(a) Perception
BC NRC
Norm Compliance
Bridge Rules
DC
NAC
Option Generation
Bridge Rules
IC
(b) Deliberation
Intention Filter
Bridge Rules
Environment
BC DC
IC
Action Selection
Bridge Rules
(c) Decision Mak-
ing
Figure 1: Reasoning phases in a multi-context BDI agent and in a n-BDI Agent. The con-
texts that contain the cognitive elements defined by Casali et al. in [12] (i.e., the contexts
BC,DC, IC) are represented as white circles. Similarly, the bridge rules defined by Casali
et al. in [12] are represented as white boxes, where: the input links represent the precondi-
tion of the bridge rules, and the output links represent the postcondition of the bridge rules.
The normative contexts and the normative bridge rules, that we propose in this paper, are
represented as grey circles and boxes.
This article is not aimed at providing an exhaustive description of how the
multi-context graded BDI agent reasons. Therefore, only those aspects that are
relevant to the normative extensions that we propose have been described. For
a complete description of the logic of the contexts and the bridge rules defined
by Casali et al. see [12]3.
3Note that the logic proposed in [12] has not been created for building agents endowed
with normative reasoning capabilities. Therefore, this logic does not deal with norms.
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2.3. Normative Definitions
Norms help to define control, coordination and cooperation mechanisms that
attempt to: (i) promote behaviours that are satisfactory to the organization,
i.e., actions that contribute to the achievement of global goals; and (ii) avoid
harmful actions, i.e., actions that prompt the system to be unsatisfactory or un-
stable. Norms have been studied from different perspectives such as philosophy
[49], sociology [43], law [1], etc. MAS research has given different meanings to
the norm concept. For example, it has been employed as a synonym of obliga-
tion and authorization [20], social law [35], social commitment [46] and other
kinds of rules imposed by societies or authorities. The purpose of this paper
is not to propose, compare or improve existing normative definitions, but to
make use of these definitions for proposing an information model, knowledge
representation and inference mechanism to allow agents to reason about norms
under uncertainty within dynamic environments. The aim of this section is to
provide the reader with the basic normative notions used in this paper.
In this paper we consider norms as formal statements that define patterns
of behaviours by means of deontic modalities (i.e., obligations and prohibitions).
Specifically, our proposal is based on the notion of norm as a general rule of be-
haviour that defines under which circumstances a pattern of behaviour becomes
relevant and must be instantiated. This notion of norm has been widely used
by the existing literature ( [31], [33] and [38]).
To express norms in a general form, we make use of a first-order predicate
language L that is built by extending the classical propositional language LP
with an infinite set of variables. In addition, the alphabet contains predicate,
constant and function symbols. Variables are implicitly universally quantified4.
In this article variables are written as any sequence of alphanumeric characters
beginning with a capital letter. Let us also assume the standard notion of
substitution of variables; i.e., a substitution σ is a finite and possibly empty set
of pairs Y/y where Y is a variable and y is a term [23]. The predicate, constant
and function symbols are written as any sequence of alphanumeric characters
beginning with a lower case letter. Specifically, there are constant symbols that
identify roles and agents. Thus, R and A are the sets containing all role and
agent identifiers, respectively. For the purpose of this paper it is necessary to
know that the relationship between agents and roles is formally represented by
a binary predicate (play). Specifically, the expression play(a, r) describes the
fact that the agent identified by a ∈ A enacts the role identified by r ∈ R.
2.3.1. Norm Definition
Given the informal definition of norm and the logic preliminaries given above,
a norm is formally defined as:
Definition 1 (Norm). A norm (n) is defined as a tuple n = 〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉,
where:
4Note that the appropriate use of Skolem functions [36] allows all existential quantifiers to
be removed without loss of expressivity.
8
• D ∈ {O,F} is the deontic modality of the norm, determining if the norm
is an obligation (O) or prohibition (F);
• C is a wff of L that represents the norm condition, i.e., it denotes the goal
or action that is controlled by the norm;
• T ∈ R is the target of the norm; i.e., the role to which the norm is
addressed;
• A is a wff of L that describes the activation condition;
• E is a wff of L that describes the expiration condition;
• S is a wff of L that describes the sanction that will be applied to the target
agents if the norm is not fulfilled;
• R is a wff of L that describes the reward that will be provided to the
target agents if the norm is fulfilled.
We assume a “closed legal system” [41], which is a normative system where
everything is considered are permitted by default. Therefore, only obligation
and prohibition norms are considered by our proposal. These norms define
exceptions to this default permission rule5.
For example, the norm that obliges firemen to abort the fire-rescue when the
situation becomes too risky is formally defined as:
〈O, abort(R), fireman, risky(R), fireExtinguished(R),−,−〉 (nfireAbortion)
We have assumed that once a rescue R is consider as a risky situation, then
the norm is active. The norm expires when the fire has been extinguished.
This norm determines when firemen are obliged to abort a rescue and, as a
consequence, this norm allows fireman to create intentions to abort the rescue.
2.3.2. Instance Definition
Once the activation conditions of a norm hold it becomes relevant and several
instances, according to the possible groundings of the activation condition, must
be created. Thus, instances are unconditional expressions that bind a particular
agent to an obligation or prohibition. Formally an instance is defined as:
Definition 2 (Instance). Given a norm n = 〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉 and a theory
Γ ⊆ LP , an instance of n is the tuple i = 〈D,C ′, AgentID,A′, E′, S′, R′〉 where:
• Γ ` σ(A) where σ is a substitution of variables in A such that σ(A) is a
logical consequence of Γ and σ(A), σ(E), σ(C), σ(S), σ(R) are grounded;
5Note that we might have used permission norms to create exceptions to the application of
more general obligation and prohibition norms. However, the resolution of exceptions among
norms is beyond the scope of this paper and has been addressed by other works such as [31].
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• A′ = σ(A), E′ = σ(E), C ′ = σ(C), S′ = σ(S) and R′ = σ(R);
• AgentID ∈ A is an agent identifier that corresponds to the agent affected
by the norm, which is playing the target role T .
When a norm is instantiated it must be grounded. In order to ensure that all
instances have no free variables, in any norm 〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉 the variables
that occur in E,C, S,R must be contained in A (i.e., vA ⊇ vE ∪ vC ∪ vS ∪ vR).
We denote vX as the set of variables occurring in any formula X.
Remember, that the fireman believes that the rescue is risky (see the first
belief in Table 1). In this case, the norm that obliges firemen to abort the
fire-rescue is instantiated as follows:
〈O, abort(gateHouse), self, risky(gateHouse),
fireExtinguished(gateHouse),−,−〉 (ifireAbortion)
Any agent identifies itself by the self constant.This instance states that the
fireman is obliged to abort the operation rescue that it is carrying out in the
gateHouse building until the fire has been extinguished.
In this section, the basic notions used in this article have been provided.
In the next sections we propose the normative extensions made to the multi-
context graded BDI architecture and we explain how these extensions allow
the development of norm-autonomous agents capable of reasoning about norms
under uncertainty within dynamic environments.
3. Normative Multi-context Graded BDI Architecture
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, there is a need for norm-
autonomous agents that are capable of reasoning about norms under uncertainty
within dynamic environments. To address this need, in this paper we propose
the Normative Multi-context Graded BDI Architecture (or n-BDI for short) [18],
which is formed by: mental contexts, which have been described in the previous
section; and normative contexts for allowing agents to acquire and maintain
norms (NAC), and to consider instances created out of relevant norms in their
decision making processes (NRC).
3.1. Normative Contexts
To endow multi-context graded BDI agents with contexts for representing
and reasoning about normative notions, we have considered the work of Sripada
et al. [47] as a reference. In this work Sripada et al. analyse the psychological
architecture subserving norms. In particular, this architecture is formed by two
closely linked innate mechanisms: one responsible for norm acquisition, and the
other maintains a database of those instances that have been created out of
relevant norms.
To allow agents to have an explicit representation of norms and instances
and to consider them in their reasoning process, additional contexts are needed.
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We have decided to represent norms and instances separately in two dedicated
contexts due to two main reasons. Firstly, we consider that representing norms
and instances independently of other mental attitudes allows us to explain the
norm reasoning with more clarity: i.e., we are able to define explicitly the rela-
tionships among norms, instances and the other contexts. Secondly, the explicit
distinction between instances and norms allows us to illustrate the differences
between them; i.e., they have a different definition, semantics and dynamics and
are considered in different steps of the reasoning process. Specifically, the two
normative contexts are:
• Norm Acquisition Context (NAC). It maintains a norm base that contains
all norms which are in force at a given moment.
• Norm Relevance Context (NRC). This is the component responsible for
maintaining the instances that have been created out of relevant norms at
a specific moment.
3.2. Reasoning Process in a n-BDI Agent
The reasoning process in a n-BDI agent is mainly performed by bridge rules
that connect mental and normative contexts. As multi-context graded BDI
agents, n-BDI agents also carry out a reasoning process in three different phases.
Specifically, in n-BDI agents the perception and deliberation phases have been
extended with new bridge rules:
Phase 1. Perception. The new bridge rules that we add to the per-
ception process are represented by the grey elements of Figure 1(a):
• Norm Acquisition Bridge Rules. These bridge rules are responsible
for inferring the norms that are in force in the agent environment.
• Norm Relevance Bridge Rules. These bridge rules create instances
out of the norms are relevant (i.e., are pertinent) to the current sit-
uation.
Phase 2. Deliberation. The new bridge rules that we add to the
deliberation process are represented by the grey elements of Figure 1(b):
• Norm Compliance Bridge Rules. The norm compliance bridge rules
determine the instances that the n-BDI agent wants to obey. Then,
the obeyed instances are propagated to the agent’s desires.
As previously mentioned, the n-BDI architecture has been formalised as
a multi-context system, which allows different logics to be used in different
contexts. In the following sections, the logics used by normative logics are
defined as well as the bridge rules that define the relationship between normative
contexts and mental contexts.
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4. Norm Acquisition Context (NAC)
According to Conte et al. [16], the problem of acquiring norms6 entails the
evaluation of candidate norms against several criteria. For example, a norm
must be rejected if the agent that issues the norm is a non-recognised author-
ity and, as a consequence, the majority of agents do not consider this norm
important.
In our proposal, the Norm Acquisition Context (NAC) allows agents to main-
tain a norm base that contains current norms; i.e., the legislation that is in force
at a given moment. Specifically, the NAC receives information from the environ-
ment, determines whether that information is relevant to norms that regulate
the agent’s environment and updates, accordingly, the existing set of norms (i.e.,
adding the new norms and deleting the obsolete ones).
For example, the fireman agent must be capable of participating in fire-rescue
operations in different regions and countries. Each region or country has its own
fire-rescue norms. Moreover, fire-rescue norms are occasionally modified. For
example, the fire-rescue strategy can be modified according to the features of the
fire that is being fought. For these reasons the fireman must be endowed with
mechanisms that allow it to update the set of norms that regulate fire-rescue
operations. Moreover, the fact that the fireman agent is capable of acquiring
norms on-line implies a greater flexibility and a reduced load at the level of the
agents’ knowledge bases [16].
Norm Acquisition. Computational models of norm acquisition receive the agent
perceptions and identify the set of norms that control the agent environment.
Perceptions which are relevant to the norm recognition may be classified into: (i)
explicit normative perceptions, which correspond to those messages exchanged
by agents in which norms are explicitly communicated; and (ii)implicit norma-
tive perceptions, which correspond to the observation of actions performed by
agents.
n-BDI agents consider only explicit normative information (i.e., those mes-
sages exchanged by agents in which norms are explicitly communicated) as the
only source of information for inferring norms. Specifically, n-BDI agents are in-
formed by expert agents (or experts for short) about the current norms. Experts
provide information about the creation (issuance) and elimination (abolition) of
norms that regulate their environment. Besides that, the set of current norms
may change both explicitly, by means of the addition, deletion or modification
of the existing norms; and implicitly by introducing new norms which are not
specifically meant to modify previous norms, but which change in fact the sys-
tem because they are incompatible with such existing norms and prevail over
6Note that the norm acquisition process have been also called norm recognition process.
For example, Campenn´ı et al. in [11] refer to this process by using the term norm recognition.
Within the MAS and psychological field the term acquisition norm has been widely used, e.g.,
both Conte et al. and Sripada et al. refer to it in [17] and [47], respectively. Given that our
proposal highly is inspired by these two works, we have adopted the term norm acquisition in
this article.
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them [28]. However, this is a complex issue which is out of the scope of this
article7. For simplicity, we do not consider here incompatibility relationships
among norms.
Norm Acceptance. The term norm salience was defined by Campenn`ı et al. in
[11] as “the degree of activity and importance of a norm within a social group
and a given context”. As psychological [15, 5] and behavioural economics [6, 50]
studies have pointed out, norm acceptance is strongly influenced by the norm
salience. Therefore, n-BDI agents should be aware of salience of norms in order
to make appropriate decisions about which norms to accept. For this reason,
n-BDI agents represent norms together with their salience.
All fire-rescue norms are not equally important. Thus, the fireman agent
needs to represent and consider the salience of fire-rescue norms to decide which
norms are less important and can be violated if necessary. Moreover, the relative
importance among these norms is a social factor that changes from one region
to other. Finally, there are specific moments (e.g., summer) or facts (e.g., when
the population is shaken by a fire that has made a great impact) that may affect
the importance that the society gives to fire-rescue norms.
The salience of norms can vary depending on social and individual factors.
The estimation of the norm salience is not trivial and it is beyond the scope
of this article. Thus, we have assumed that the norm salience is estimated by
experts which provide this information to n-BDI agents.
Since the identification of norms and the determination of their salience
is a complex problem, it seems appropriate that n-BDI agents consider the
information sent by multiple experts, since multiple experts can provide more
information than a single expert.
4.1. NAC Language
4.1.1. Syntax
The NAC contains the set of in force norms making use of two normative
predicates: the opinion predicate, which is used for representing the salience
that each expert assigns to a norm; and the norm predicate, which is used
for representing the salience that the n-BDI agent assigns to a norm. Thus,
the NAC is formed by expressions such as norm(n, ρ), where n is a norm and
ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a real value that represents the salience of this norm. The NAC
also contains expressions such as opinion(n, j, ρ) where n is a norm, j identifies
the expert that has provided the opinion and ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the salience value that
expert j has expressed for norm n. These two types of expressions are closely
related. In particular, the opinions provided by experts are used by n-BDI
agents to estimate the salience of norms.
7Proposals presented at the Formal Models of Norm Change
(http://www.cs.uu.nl/events/normchange2/) are good examples of proposals which provide
a formal analysis of all kinds of dynamic aspects involved in systems of norms.
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4.1.2. Semantics
We define the semantics of the NAC language using operational semantics8
[40]. Specifically, the operational semantics of the NAC is given by a set of rules
that define a transition relationships between configurations 〈Opinion,Norm〉
of the NAC where:
• Opinion is a set of norm opinions, where each opinion is an expression
such as opinion(n, j, ρ) that represents the salience (ρ) that an expert j
assigns to a norm n.
• Norm is a set of norm(n, ρ) expressions that represent the salience (ρ)
that the agent assigns to a norm n.
In the general case, in the agent’s initial configuration both Opinion and Norm
are empty. The operational rules for the NAC language formalise the transitions
between possible configurations of the NAC as follows:
preCond
Conf → Conf ′
where the top of the rule — represented by the expression preCond — is a
boolean expression that represents the precondition of the rule, and the bottom
of the rule — represented by the expression Conf → Conf ′— defines the tran-
sitions between configurations: i.e., how the initial configuration — represented
by the expression Conf— changes once the rule is applied —represented by the
expression Conf ′.
Norm Opinion Operational Rules. The inference process of the NAC starts
when a new norm opinion is generated. When an expert provides its first opin-
ion about a norm, then the opinion is directly inserted into the NAC according
to the following operational rule:
opinion(n, j, ρ) ∈ f∆(ΓBC ,ΓDC ,ΓIC ,ΓNAC ,ΓNRC) ∧ 6 ∃ρ′ : opinion(n, j, ρ′) ∈ Opinion
〈Opinion,Norm〉 −→ 〈Opinion′, Norm〉
Opinion′ = Opinion ∪ {opinion(n, j, ρ)}
(a)
where f∆ is a function that returns the set of formulas that are inferred by the
bridge rules (∆) according to the information present in the contexts of a n-BDI
agent (i.e., in the ΓBC ,ΓDC ,ΓIC ,ΓNAC and ΓNRC).
Later, when an expert provides a subsequent opinion about the same norm,
the norm opinion set is updated according to the following operational rule:
8Operational semantics has been widely used for specifying norm semantics in MAS[2, 48].
Moreover, operational semantics describes how the logic statements are used by sequences of
computational steps, which has facilitated us the use of a functional programming language
to implement our architecture and perform experiments to assess empirically our proposal.
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opinion(n, j, ρ) ∈ f∆(ΓBC ,ΓDC ,ΓIC ,ΓNAC ,ΓNRC) ∧ ∃ρ′ : opinion(n, j, ρ′) ∈ Opinion
〈Opinion,Norm〉 −→ 〈Opinion′, Norm〉
Opinion′ = Opinion \ {opinion(n, j, ρ′)} ∪ {opinion(n, j, ρ)}
(a*)
Norm Operational Rules. There are also operational rules that define the pro-
cess by which the inferred norms are inserted inside the NAC. If a norm is
inferred for the first time, then it is inserted into the NAC as indicated by the
following operational rule:
norm(n, ρ) ∈ f∆(ΓBC ,ΓDC ,ΓIC ,ΓNAC ,ΓNRC) ∧ 6 ∃ρ′ : norm(n, ρ′) ∈ Norm
〈Opinion,Norm〉 −→ 〈Opinion,Norm′〉
Norm′ = Norm ∪ {norm(n, ρ)}
(b)
Later, when the same norm is deduced again, then the norm set is updated
according to the following operational rule:
norm(n, ρ) ∈ f∆(ΓBC ,ΓDC ,ΓIC ,ΓNAC ,ΓNRC) ∧ ∃ρ′ : norm(n, ρ′) ∈ Norm
〈Opinion,Norm〉 −→ 〈Opinion,Norm′〉
Norm′ = Norm \ {norm(n, ρ′)} ∪ {norm(n, ρ)}
(b*)
Both the syntax and the operational rules of the NAC have been explained
in this section. Next, we describe the norm acquisition bridge rules that infer
the opinions and the norms that trigger the execution of these operational rules.
4.2. Norm Acquisition Bridge Rules
The process by which n-BDI agents update the norms and their salience is
performed by a set of bridge rules that are applied any time the agent receives
a message that informs about a change in the normative system (i.e., the set
of norms that are in force). Therefore, these bridge rules (named as norm
acquisition bridge rules in Figure 1(a)) relate the belief context (BC) —in which
received messages are inserted— to the NAC — which contains the mental
representation of norms. Specifically, two norm acquisition bridge rules are
applied by n-BDI agents: (i) norm opinion, and (ii) salience aggregation bridge
rules.
4.2.1. Norm Opinion Bridge Rule
Communication related to the information about norms is considered by the
norm opinion bridge rule for generating norm opinion expressions. Specifically,
we define this rule as follows:
BC : (B inform(J, norm(〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉) ∧ salience(ρ)), ρBC) ∧ ρBC ≥ δV alidity
NAC : opinion(〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉, J, ρ)
If an agent is informed by another agent (the expert) J about the existence of a
norm — represented by the expression norm(〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉)∧salience(ρ)
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—, then this information must be employed for generating a new norm opinion.
ρ is the salience that the expert assigns to the norm and ρBC is the validity of the
message. The validity of messages is determined in terms of their integrity, i.e., it
can be calculated depending on several factors such as the security of the channel
through it has been received, the possibility of identifying the provenance of the
message, etc. Determining the validity of messages is beyond the scope of this
paper. For simplicity, we define that only those messages whose validity is higher
or equal to a validity threshold — represented by the expression δV alidity — are
taken into account by the norm opinion bridge rule.
If the expert has not informed previously about this norm, Rule (a) is ex-
ecuted and a new opinion is inserted inside the NAC. Later, the expert might
change the norm salience. In this case, the opinion that is stored in the NAC is
updated as indicated by Rule (a*).
An expert considers that a norm has been abolished when it believes that the
norm is not important anymore. Thus, experts inform n-BDI agents about the
deletion of norms by sending messages in which they indicate that the salience
of the abolished norm is 0.
For example, the fireman is informed by three experts9 (expert1, expert2 and
expert3) that have different opinions about the salience of the rescue abortion
norm (see the last three beliefs in Table 1). These messages have the maximum
reliability and are considered by the norm opinion bridge rule. This bridge rule
is applied for each one of the experts and, as a consequence, three norm opinion
expressions are inserted inside the NAC (see the first three expressions in row
NAC of Table 1).
4.2.2. Salience Aggregation Bridge Rule
As previously stated, opinions from experts are considered for determining
the salience that n-BDI agents assign to norms. Specifically, we propose that
all opinions sent by different experts about the same norm are combined by the
salience aggregation bridge rule as follows:
NAC : opinion(〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉, J1, ρ1)
...
NAC : opinion(〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉, JK , ρK)
NAC : norm(〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉, fAggregation({ρ1, ..., ρK}))
This bridge rule will be executed any time an opinion changes. The fAggregation
function aggregates opinions of experts by using a robust aggregation operator
that reduces the impact of outlier experts. Specifically, all opinions are combined
using the Robust Linear Opinion Pool (R-LOP) technique proposed by Garc´ıa
et al. in [24] . Specifically, the R-LOP measures the conflict level introduced
9For example, these three experts can be its instructior in the fire department, its boss at
the fire station and the leader of its fire brigade. Each one of these experts may have their
own view about the importance of the norm and therefore they provide the agent with three
different opinions.
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by every expert by taking into account the similarity between its opinion and
expertise level, and the other experts. The calculation of the expertise levels
is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we assume that agents consider that
all experts have the same expertise level. In this case the R-LOP technique is
applied as follows.
Given a set of K elements Ψ = {ψ1, ..., ψK}, where each ψ1 ∈ [0, 1]; the
similarity between one of the elements in Ψ and the other elements is defined
as:
Simi(Ψ) = Sim(ψi,Ψ \ {ψi}) = 1− 1
K − 1
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
|ψi − ψk|
Let us consider that there are K independent experts that express their
opinion about salience of a given norm. Let O = {ρ1, ..., ρK}, where each
ρj ∈ [0, 1], represents the salience values given by the different experts about
the same norm. An expert who disagrees with the majority of other experts
is assumed to be conflicting (i.e., it is an “outlier” expert). Based on this, the
reliability of each expert j is calculated as follows:
Reliabilityj = Simj(O)
Basically, the reliability of an expert represents to what extent this expert can
be trusted because it behaves well as a norm expert.
The aggregated salience is obtained by the fAggregation function as the
weighted average of the salience values, with the weights being the reliability
levels determined as before:
Definition 3 (Aggregation Function). Given a set O = {ρ1, ..., ρK}, where
each ρj ∈ [0, 1] represents the set of salience values given by the different experts
about the same norm; the aggregated salience is a real function defined as
follows:
fAggregation(O) =
K∑
j=1
oj ×Reliabilityj
K∑
j=1
Reliabilityj
According to the norm opinions that the fireman agent knows (see the
first three expressions in row NAC of Table 1), the set of opinions is O =
{0.75, 0.2, 0.8}. The similarities between each one of the salience values in O
and the other two values is Sim(O) = {0.7, 0.425, 0.675}. According to these
similarities, the second expert is the least reliable and its opinion must be less
considered. As a consequence, the combined salience is more influenced by the
other two experts and takes 0.6410. Thus, the salience aggregation bridge rule
generates the last expression in row NAC of Table 1.
10fAggregation({0.75, 0.2, 0.8}) = (0.75×0.7)+(0.2×0.425)+(0.8×0.675)0.7+0.425+0.675 = 0.64
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5. Norm Relevance Context (NRC)
The Norm Relevance Context (NRC) is the component responsible for main-
taining the instances that have been created out of relevant norms. Thus, the
NAC recognises all norms that are in force, whereas the NRC only contains
those instances which are active according to the current situation.
For example, fire-rescue norms are general norms that are not always active.
Some of them, such as the nfireAbortion norm, only come into effect under specific
circumstances; e.g., in risky situations. What is considered as a risky situation
is ambiguous. Therefore, there are norms that come into effect under uncertain
circumstances. As a result, the fireman agent needs to be able to detect the
activation and expiration conditions on the basis of uncertain beliefs. This
section illustrates how n-BDI agents manage the activation and expiration of
norms under uncertainty.
5.1. NRC Language
5.1.1. Syntax
The NRC contains information about instances using the instance predicate.
Thus, it contains expressions such as: instance(i, ρ) where i is an instance and
ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a real value that represents the relevance degree of the instance (i.e.,
the degree in which the instance is pertinent to the current circumstances of the
agent).
5.1.2. Semantics
Again, we define the operational semantics of the NRC language by a set
of operational rules that define a transition relationship between configurations
〈Instance〉 of the NRC where:
• Instance is a set of instances, where each instance is an expression such
as instance(i, ρ) where i is an instance and ρ is the certainty degree of the
instance.
In the general case, an agent’s initial configuration is 〈Instance〉 where Instance
is empty.
Instance Operational Rules. The reasoning cycle starts when a new instance is
generated (the process by which instances are inferred in the NRC by norm
relevance bridge rules is described below in Section 5.2). Since this is the first
time that an instance is deduced, it is inserted into the NRC according to the
following operational rule:
instance(i, ρ) ∈ f∆(ΓBC ,ΓDC ,ΓIC ,ΓNAC ,ΓNRC) ∧ 6 ∃ρ′ : instance(i, ρ′) ∈ Instance
〈Instance〉 −→ 〈Instance′〉
Instance′ = Instance ∪ {instance(i, ρ)}
(c)
When an instance that already belongs to the NRC is deduced again, then
the instance set is updated according to the following operational rule:
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instance(i, ρ) ∈ f∆(ΓBC ,ΓDC ,ΓIC ,ΓNAC ,ΓNRC) ∧ ∃ρ′ : instance(i, ρ′) ∈ Instance
〈Instance〉 −→ 〈Instance′〉
Instance′ = Instance \ {instance(i, ρ′)} ∪ {instance(i, ρ)}
(c*)
The language that allows instances to be represented in the NRC has been
explained in this section. Next, we describe the bridge rules that infer instances
inside the NRC causing the execution of the NRC operational rules.
5.2. Norm Relevance Bridge Rules
As stated before, norms are not always active. Thus, instances are created
inside the agents’ mind when the agent has beliefs that sustain the activation
of norms. Similarly, norms also include an expiration condition that defines
the validity period or deadline of instances. Thus, agents must believe that
a given instance has expired in order to delete its mental representation. As
illustrated by Figure 1(a), norm relevance bridge rules relate the agent beliefs
(BC) and the mental representation of norms (NAC) to infer instances (NRC).
Specifically, two norm relevance bridge rules are executed by n-BDI agents: (i)
instance activation and (ii) instance expiration bridge rules.
5.2.1. Instance Activation Bridge Rules
When the agent knows a norm and it believes that there is an agent, which
can be itself, under the influence of this norm (i.e., there is an agent that enacts
the target role of the norm) and the norm is relevant to the current situation;
then a new instance must be created. To model this reasoning process we define
the norm relevance bridge rule as follows:
NAC : norm(〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉, ρNAC),
BC : (B σ(A), ρσ(A)), BC : (B play(AgentID, T ), ρT )
NRC : instance(〈D,σ(C), AgentID, σ(A), σ(E), σ(S), σ(R)〉, fRelevance(ρNAC , ρσ(A), ρT ))
If an agent considers that a norm — represented by the expression 〈D,C, T,A,E, S,R〉
— is currently active — i.e., there is a substitution σ such as the expression
(B σ(A), ρσ(A)) is deduced in BC; where σ(A) denotes the result of applying
σ to A, and ρσ(A) is a real number within the [0, 1] interval representing the
certainty about this belief — and the agent knows that there is an agent —
represented by the expression AgentID — that it is under the influence of the
norm — i.e., the expression (B play(AgentID, T ), ρT ) is deduced in BC; where
play(AgentID, T ) denotes fact that AgentID is playing role T , and ρT is a real
number within the [0, 1] interval representing the certainty about this belief—,
then a new instance is generated11.
11Note that n-BDI agents create instances that affect them and also instances that affect
other agents. It allows n-BDI agents to be aware of which norms affect other agents, which can
be useful for predicting and evaluating the behaviour of their interaction partners. However,
this predicting and evaluating feature is beyond the scope of this article.
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Therefore, agents should believe simultaneously that a given norm is active
and that an agent is under its influence to create an instance that binds this
particular agent to the norm. 12.
fRelevance is defined as a numerical fusion operator
13 that can be given dif-
ferent definitions depending on the properties that are required in each concrete
application. In particular, the relevance degree assigned by the fRelevance func-
tion is a combination among the salience of the norm — represented by the
expression ρNAC —, the certainty about the activation of the norm — repre-
sented by the expression ρσ(A) — and the certainty about the fact that the agent
is affected by the norm — represented by the expression ρT . In this article, we
assume that the conditions that are necessary to create an instance (i.e., the
existence of an important norm and the two beliefs) are independent (e.g., the
consideration of a norm as important does not imply that the activation con-
dition of this norm holds). Given that the intersection or join certainty about
independent events is the product among the event certainties, we define the
combination among the uncertain values that cause the instantiation of a norm
as follows:
fRelevance(ρNAC , ρσ(A), ρT ) = ρNAC × ρσ(A) × ρT
According to the information in Table 1, the fireman is completely sure about
being acting as a fireman (see the the fourth belief in row BC). Moreover, it
considers that it participates in a risky rescue with a 50% of probability (see the
first belief in row BC). Therefore, the instance activation bridge rule is applied
as follows14:
NAC : norm(〈O, abort(R), fireman, risky(R), fireExtingished(R),−,−〉, 0.64),
BC : (B risky(gateHouse), 0.5), BC : (B play(self, fireman), 1)
NRC : instance(〈O, abort(gateHouse), fireman, risky(gateHouse),
fireExtingished(gateHouse),−,−〉, fRelevance(0.64, 0.5, 1))
where σ = {R/gateHouse}. Thus, a new instance is generated. The rele-
vance of this new instance is 0.3215. This instance triggers the execution of the
operational Rule (b), and, as a consequence, the NRC contains the following
expression (see row NRC of Table 1):
instance(〈O, abort(gateHouse), fireman, risky(gateHouse),
fireExtingished(gateHouse),−,−〉, 0.32)
12For the purpose of this paper it is only necessary to know that n-BDI agents have graded
beliefs that represent their knowledge about the environment and the roles played by agents
in the environment. The process by which agents use their perceptions for inferring these
beliefs is beyond the scope of this paper
13For a review and classification of data fusion operators see [7].
14nfireAdoption was defined in Section 2.3
15fRelevance(0.64, 0.5, 1) = 0.64× 0.5× 1 = 0.32
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5.2.2. Instance Expiration Bridge Rule
Once the expiration condition of an instance holds, then the certainty of
the instance must be reduced. To model this reasoning process we define the
instance expiration bridge rule as follows:
NRC : instance(〈D,C,AgentID,A,E, S,R〉, ρNRC),
BC : (BE, ρE)
NRC : instance(〈D,C,AgentID,A,E, S,R〉,
fExpiration(ρNRC , ρE))
If the NRC of an agent contains an instance — represented by the expression
instance(〈D,C,AgentID,A,E, S,R〉, ρNRC) — and it has a belief that sustains
its expiration — represented by the expression (BE, ρE) —, then the degree of
the instance must be reduced16. Specifically, the belief (BE, ρE) disconfirms
with the instance. Thus, any fusion operator that combines evidences that
confirm and disconfirm an hypothesis can be used. In this paper we use a simple
fusion operator that reduces the relevance of the instance by the certainty of
the disconfirming belief. Thus, we define the fExpiration function as follows:
fExpiration(ρNRC , ρE) = max(0, ρNRC − ρE)
Therefore, the fExpiration : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a function such that [45]
the unit element is 0, which is an information that says nothing and does not
influence the combination. If there is a high certainty about the expiration of
the instance, the relevance degree of the instance would become 0. In this case,
the instance would no longer be considered by the n-BDI agent.
In the n-BDI proposal the notion of role has been used to define the sphere
of influence of norms. The use of norms for defining the responsibilities, duties
and rights of roles has been proposed also in other works such as [33, 37, 22].
Similarly, in the n-BDI proposal, activation and expiration conditions have been
used to define the period in which norms come into effect. Activation and
expiration conditions have been considered in other well-known proposals on
normative agents [33, 37, 31]. However, all of these previous proposals do not
consider that agents have an uncertain knowledge of the world. Therefore, only
the n-BDI proposal confronts with the activation and expiration of norms under
uncertainty.
6. Norm Compliance Bridge Rules
Once norms have been instantiated and their relevance has been determined,
a n-BDI agent must decide whether it observes or violates each specific instance
(i.e. it makes a decision about norm compliance) and how its behaviour will be
16Note that the expiration condition of any instance is grounded and, as a consequence, no
substitution is applied in the instance expiration bridge rule.
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modified according to its decision (e.g., to comply with an obligation instance).
To model this reasoning process we propose the norm compliance bridge rules.
These rules are executed once a new instance has been created or an existing
instance has been updated. Then, the agent makes a decision about norm
compliance (i.e., it calculates its willingness to comply with the instance) and
updates its mental state accordingly. The process by which agents extend their
mental state according to their decisions about norm compliance (i.e., according
to the instances that they want to follow or transgress) has been described by
the self-determination theory [19] as a dynamic relation between norms and
goals. Accordingly, we have considered the translation of norms into desires.
Depending on the desirability degree of these new desires, they may generate
new intentions to be executed or they may be used to select the most suitable
plan that achieves another goal that is more desired.
Norm compliance bridge rules (see Figure 1(b)) relate instances (NRC) with
the agent beliefs (BC) and desires (DC) to infer new desires according to norms.
These bridge rules depend on the deontic modality of the instance that is con-
sidered.
Obligation Compliance Bridge Rule. If the agent is affected by an obligation
and the agent is willing to comply with this obligation, then desire for reaching
the state imposed by the obligation must be created. Specifically, we propose
the following bridge rule:
NRC : instance(〈O, C, self, A,E, S,R〉, ρNRC)
fWillingness(〈O, C, self, A,E, S,R〉,ΓBC ,ΓDC) > δCompliance
DC : (D C, fSubjectiveV alue(ρNRC , fWillingness(〈O, C, self, A,E, S,R〉,ΓBC ,ΓDC)))
where δCompliance ∈ [0, 1] is the norm compliance threshold. The fWillingness
function17 calculates the agent willingness to comply with a given instance as
a real value within the [−1, 1] interval. When it takes a value higher than
δCompliance, it means that the agent is willing to comply with the obligation.
The degree assigned to the new desire inferred from the obligation instance is
calculated by the fSubjectiveV alue function
18.
Prohibition Compliance Bridge Rule. If the agent is affected by a prohibition
and the agent wants to obey it, then a negative desire must be created to avoid
the forbidden state. Specifically, we propose the following bridge rule:
NRC : instance(〈F , C, self, A,E, S,R〉, ρNRC)
fWillingness(〈F , C, self, A,E, S,R〉,ΓBC ,ΓDC) > δCompliance
DC : (D¬C, fSubjectiveV alue(ρNRC , fWillingness(〈F , C, self, A,E, S,R〉,ΓBC ,ΓDC))
As in case of obligations, the degree assigned to the new desire is calculated by
the fSubjectiveV alue function.
17To be explained in Section 6.1.
18To be explained in Section 6.2.
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The norm compliance bridge rules, explain how the instances are considered
for extending the agent mental state in order to fulfil these instances. There
are two key functions for the norm compliance bridge rules: the function that
calculates the willingness to comply with an instance (fWillingness), and the
function that assigns a degree to the new desire (fSubjectiveV alue). Next, we
define these two functions.
6.1. Willingness Function.
The results calculated by the fWillingness function represent the agent will-
ingness to comply with norms; i.e., it models the decisions about norm com-
pliance. To calculate this willingness agents consider the situations that are
predicted to occur when norms are fulfilled and violated (i.e., the norm conse-
quences). We define the consequences of obeying an instance as follows:
Definition 4 (Fulfilment Consequences). Given an instance (〈D,C, self,
A,E, S,R〉) and a theory of beliefs (ΓBC), the predicted consequences of fulfill-
ing this instance are defined as follows:
fF (〈D,C, self, A,E, S,R〉,ΓBC) ={(C, 1), (R, 1)} ∪ {(γj , ρj)|∀γj , ρj : ΓBC ` (B C → γj , ρj)} if D = O{(¬C, 1), (R, 1)} ∪ {(γj , ρj)|∀γj , ρj : ΓBC ` (B ¬C → γj , ρj)} if D = F
Thus, the fulfilment consequences are a set of pairs (γ, ρ), where γ ∈ LP repre-
sents a situation that is predicted to occur if the norm is fulfilled; and ρ ∈ [0, 1]
is the probability of this predicted situation. Specifically, we consider three kind
of consequences:
• Direct Consequence. In case of an obligation, the direct consequence of the
fulfilment of the obligation is the norm condition (C) that will be achieved
with a probability of 1. The direct consequence of an obligation instance
is denoted by the pair (C, 1) in the previous definition; where C is the
obliged condition and 1 is the probability in which the C will be true if
the obligation instance is fulfilled. In case of a prohibition, obeying this
prohibition implies that the norm condition will be avoided (¬C). The
direct consequence of complying with a prohibition instance is denoted
by the pair (¬C, 1) in the previous definition; where C is the forbidden
condition and 1 is the probability in which the ¬C will be true if the
prohibition instance is fulfilled.
• Enforcement Mechanisms. The reward (R) is another consequence of the
norm fulfilment. For simplicity, we assume that there is a perfect en-
forcement that always punishes offenders and rewards obedience. As a
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consequence, the probability19 of being rewarded is 1. Therefore, the en-
forcement consequences of fulfilling instances is denoted by the pair (R, 1)
in the previous definition; where R is the reward and 1 is the probability
in which the R will be true if the instance is fulfilled.
• Indirect Consequences. The logical connective → is used to represent
explanatory relationships between propositions. Thus, a belief such as
(α → γj , ρj) means that the situation or state represented by α explains
or causes γj with a probability of ρj . An obligation is obeyed when the
norm condition (C) is achieved. Therefore, the indirect consequences of
obeying the obligation are defined by considering those beliefs such as
(B C → γj , ρj). Similarly, the indirect consequences of fulfilling of a
prohibition is calculated by considering those beliefs such as (B ¬C →
γj , ρj).
We define the consequences of violating an instance as follows:
Definition 5 (Violation Consequences). Given an instance (〈D,C, self, A,E, S,R〉)
and a theory of beliefs (ΓBC), the predicted consequences of violating this in-
stance are defined as follows:
fV (〈D,C, self, A,E, S,R〉,ΓBC) ={(¬C, 1), (S, 1)} ∪ {(γj , ρj)|∀γj , ρj : ΓBC ` (B ¬C → γj , ρj)} if D = O{(C, 1), (S, 1)} ∪ {(γj , ρj)|∀γj , ρj : ΓBC ` (B C → γj , ρj)} if D = F
Again, the consequences of violating a norm are calculated considering the
direct consequence, the enforcement mechanisms (i.e., the sanction) and the
indirect consequences of violating the instance. Specifically, the three kind of
consequences are:
• Direct Consequence. In case of an obligation, the direct consequence of
the violation of the obligation is the negation of the norm condition (¬C).
In contrast, violating a prohibition implies that the norm condition will
be achieved (C).
• Enforcement Mechanisms. The sanction (S) is another consequence of
the norm violation. This consequence is denoted by the pair (S, 1) in the
previous definition.
• Indirect Consequences. An obligation is violated when the norm condition
(C) is achieved. Therefore, the indirect consequences of violating the obli-
gation are defined by considering those beliefs such as (B ¬C → γj , ρj).
Similarly, the indirect consequences of violating of a prohibition is calcu-
lated by considering those beliefs such as (B C → γj , ρj).
19If agents are able to perceive the probability of being punished or rewarded, then these
probabilities may be used.
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As previously mentioned, n-BDI agents calculate its willingness to comply
with norms considering the consequences of violating and fulfilling an instance.
Specifically, the main factors on the willingness functions are the probability
of the predicted consequences and the desirability (vs. undesirability) of these
consequences. We formally define the willingness function as follows:
Definition 6 (Willingness Function). Given an instance i, a set of beliefs
ΓBC , a set of desires ΓDC and an instance i; the agent’s willingness to follow
this instance is calculated by the fWillingness function as follows:
fWillingness(i,ΓBC ,ΓDC) =
∑
∀(γj ,ρj)∈fF (i,ΓBC)
ρj ∗ des(γj ,ΓDC)
∑
∀(γj ,ρj)∈fF (i,ΓBC)
ρj
−
∑
∀(γj ,ρj)∈fV (i,ΓBC)
ρj ∗ des(γj ,ΓDC)
∑
∀(γj ,ρj)∈fV (i,ΓBC)
ρj
where the function des calculates the desirability of a proposition20.
Thus, fWillingness is a function that calculates the willingness of a n-BDI agent
to comply with an instance as a real value within the [−1, 1] interval. Specifi-
cally, it considers the desirability of the fulfilment consequences minus the de-
sirability of the violation consequences. Specifically, the first element of the
subtraction in the fWillingness function is an average among the desirability
(denoted by des(γj ,ΓDC)) of the consequences that are predicted to occur if the
instance is fulfilled21. Given that all consequences are not predicted to occur
with the same probability, the desirability of consequences has been weighted by
the probability of their occurrence (denoted by ρj). Thus, those consequences
more likely to occur are the most important when calculating the desirability
of fulfilment consequences. In contrast, the second element of the subtraction
in the fWillingness function is an average among the desirability of the conse-
quences that are predicted to occur if the instance is violated22. Again, these
desirabilities have been weighted by the probability of their occurrence.
A positive value of fWillingness means that the agent hopes that the ful-
filment of the instance entails desirable consequences and, as a consequence,
20The desirability of a proposition is formally defined as:
des(γ,ΓDC) =

ργ − ρ¬γ if ΓDC ` (γ, ργ) and ΓDC ` (¬γ, ρ¬γ)
ργ if ΓDC ` (γ, ργ) and ΓDC 6` (¬γ, ρ¬γ)
−ρ¬γ if ΓDC ` (¬γ, ρ¬γ) and ΓDC 6` (γ, ργ)
0 otherwise
Therefore, the desirability of a proposition γ (i.e., des(γ,ΓDC)) is a real value within the
[−1, 1] interval such that: the −1 value means that the proposition γ is absolutely rejected, a
desirability value of 0 means that the agent is indifferent to γ (i.e., it does not benefit from
γ), and 1 means that the agent has maximum preference on γ.
21Note that the two summations on the first element on the subtraction are calculated over
the result of function fF .
22Note that the two summations on the second element on the subtraction are calculated
over the result of function fV .
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sustains the fulfilment of the instance. In contrast, a negative value of the
fWillingness function sustains the violation of the instance.
In the proposed case study, the fireman is affected by the ifireAbortion in-
stance. This instance causes the execution of the obligation compliance as fol-
lows:
NRC : instance(ifireAbortion, 0.32)
fWillingness(ifireAbortion,ΓBC ,ΓDC) > δCompliance
DC : (D abort(gateHouse),
fSubjectiveV alue(0.32, fWillingness(ifireAbortion,ΓBC ,ΓDC)))
According to the information that is contained in the fireman theory (see Table
1), the predicted consequences of fulfilling the ifireAbortion instance are defined
as follows:
fF (ifireAbortion,ΓBC) = {(abort(gateHouse), 1)} ∪ {(survive(self), 0.5)}
Similarly, the predicted consequences of violating i are defined as follows:
fV (ifireAbortion,ΓBC) = {(¬abort(gateHouse), 1)} ∪ {(survive(victims), 0.25)}
Since the ifireAbortion instance is not enforced, then the fireman has no expec-
tation of being neither sanctioned nor rewarded (i.e. the probability of these
consequences is 0). So, the fWillingness function is calculated as follows:
fWillingness(ifireAbortion,ΓBC ,ΓDC) =
1×0+0.5×1
1+0.5 − 1×0+0.25×11+0.25 =
0.33− 0.2 = 0.13
6.2. Subjective Value Function.
The degree assigned to the desires generated by the norm compliance bridge
rules is defined by the fSubjectiveV alue function, which combines the relevance
of the instance and the motivation to comply with this instance as a real value
within the [0, 1] interval. Both conditions, the relevance of the instance and the
motivation to comply with it, are required for creating a new desire. Again,
we consider that these two conditions are independent and we combine the
uncertain values that cause the translation of the norm into a desire as a product:
fSubjectiveV alue(ρNRC , ρWillingness) = ρNRC × ρWillingness
where ρWillingness = fWillingness(〈D,C, self, A,E, S,R〉,ΓBC ,ΓDC).
In our example, the fSubjectiveV alue is calculated as follows:
fSubjectiveV alue(0.32, 0.13) = 0.32× 0.01 = 0.04
Thus the the obligation compliance bridge rule is instantiated as follows:
NRC : instance(ifireAbortion, 0.32), 0.13 > δCompliance
DC : (D abort(gateHouse), 0.04)
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Assuming δCompliance = 0.05 (in the next section we describe how the most
suitable value for this threshold has been estimated in this case-study) then a
new desire to abort rescue is inferred inside the DC. Since this desire that can
be achieved through a plan, then the fireman aborts its intention to continue
with the rescue and creates a new intention to abort the rescue. This will cause
that the agent executes the plan for abandoning the gateHouse building.
In this section we have proposed several bridge rules and functions that
allow agents to reason about norm compliance. Specifically, in this section
we have described how n-BDI agents consider both their preferences and the
norm repercussions when they determine their willingness to comply with norms.
In the next section we describe the experiment that we have carried out to
evaluate the performance of n-BDI agents under uncertainty within dynamic
environments.
7. Evaluation
We have performed an experiment to evaluate to what extent having an
explicit declarative procedure for reasoning about norms under uncertainty helps
agents to adapt successfully to dynamic environments. Specifically, we seek to
compare the results obtained by n-BDI agents with agents that are unaware
of norms and with agents that make decisions about norm compliance using a
static method. To this aim, we have developed a simulator of the fire-rescue
scenario.
7.1. Fire-Rescue Scenario Modelling
The fire-rescue case study has been modelled as a grid. Thus, victims are
randomly located in the grid. The fireman is initially located at the door of
the building. For simplicity we have assumed that the building has one door.
Initially there is one fire that is randomly positioned in the grid. In each iteration
a new fire is created on a free position of the grid. Figure 2 illustrates an example
of a rescue grid. Specifically, this fire-rescue scenario is modelled as a grid of
size 4, the door size is 3 and there are 3 victims that have not been rescued yet.
EXIT
Figure 2: Example of a grid that models a fire-rescue scenario
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We have performed different simulations for comparing the results that are
obtained by three different implementations of the fireman: (i) non-normative
fireman, which does not consider norms; (ii) norm-constrained fireman, which
translates norms into constraints; and (iii) n-BDI fireman, which is implemented
using the n-BDI architecture. Next, the different fireman implementations and
the results obtained by these implementations are described in detail.
7.2. Fireman Modelling
7.2.1. Non-Normative Fireman
In this implementation the fireman is not aware of norms. It moves randomly
along the grid searching for victims. When the fireman finds a victim, it builds
a path to the reach the victim. If this path exists, then the fireman tries to reach
the victim. If the fireman is able to reach the victim, then it carries the victim
to the door. Once the victim has been rescued, the fireman moves randomly
again to find another victim. The fireman follows this pattern until it completes
the rescue (i.e., it rescues all victims that are reachable) or it dies.
7.2.2. Norm-Constrained Fireman
In this implementation the fireman has knowledge about the nfireAbortion
norm. However, the fireman uses static and fixed mechanisms for reasoning
about norms. Specifically, this obligation norm has been translated into a con-
straint using a static threshold. In each iteration, the fireman calculates the
risk. If the risk is higher than a fixed risk threshold, then the fireman stops
the fire-rescue and it goes to the door. Therefore, norm-constrained fireman is
not able to adapt their norm compliance decisions to different situations since
it always follows the same constraint determined by a static risk threshold. The
risk of a given situation is calculated as the percentage of the surrounding posi-
tions that are in flames. In this simulation, we assume that the fireman is able
to determine whether the positions that are next to it are in flames or not.
7.2.3. n-BDI Fireman
The n-BDI fireman has explicit knowledge about the nfireAbortion norm and
it uses expressive and flexible methods for reasoning about norm compliance.
For simplicity, we assume that the n-BDI fireman has been informed about
the salience of the obligation by three experts and that the salience it assigns
to this norm is 0.64 (as described in Section 4.2).
As explained before in Section 5.2, norms become relevant when their acti-
vation condition holds and the agent believes that it is under the influence of
the norm. In this implementation, we assume that the fireman believes that it
is playing fireman role with the highest certainty (i.e., the fireman is working
at this moment and according to Table 1 the certainty of this belief is 1). The
risk of a situation is calculated as in in case of the norm-constrained fireman.
According to the definition of the fRelevance function (see Section 5.2), the rel-
evance of the obligation is calculated as a product between the certainty about
the activation condition (or the risk), the certainty in which the agent believes
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that it is under the influence of the norm and the norm salience (according to
Table 1 the salience of the norm is 0.64). Once the relevance of the obligation
norm has been calculated, then the fireman executes the Obligation Compli-
ance Bridge Rule (described in Section 6). According to this rule, when the
value calculated by the willingness function is higher than the norm compliance
threshold, then a new desire is created for achieving the obligatory condition.
According to the definition of the willingness function (explained in Section
6.1), its value is calculated considering the fulfilment and violation consequences.
The predicted consequences of fulfilling the ifireAbortion instance are defined as
follows:
fF (ifireAbortion,ΓBC) = {(abort(gateHouse), 1)} ∪ {(survive(self), probSurvive)}
where probSurvive stands for the probability of surviving if the fireman aborts
the rescue. Similarly, the predicted consequences of violating i are defined as
follows:
fV (ifireAbortion,ΓBC) = {(¬abort(gateHouse), 1)} ∪ {(survive(victims), probSaveV ictims)}
where probSaveV ictims stands for the probability of saving one more victim.
Thus, the indirect consequence of the obligation fulfilment is that the fireman
survives to the fire-rescue, whereas the indirect consequence of the obligation
violation is that more victims can be rescued.
We assume that the fireman does not have any desire related to the can-
cellation of the fire-rescue. Thus, this case study helps us to illustrate how
n-BDI agents are able to make decisions about norm compliance even if norms
do not affect directly the agent goals. In this situation, the willingness function
is calculated as follows:
(1 ∗ 0) + (probSurvive ∗ desSurvive)
1 + probSurvive
− (1 ∗ 0) + (probSaveV ictims ∗ desSaveV ictims)
1 + desSaveV ictims
The concrete desirability of these prepositions (desSurvive and desSaveV ictims)
determines the personality of the fireman.
The probability of saving one more victim is calculated as follows:
• When the fireman is carrying a victim then the probability of saving this
victim is 1.
• If it is not the case, the fireman looks its surroundings and searches for
victims. The probability of saving these victims is calculated by consider-
ing the Manhattan distance [32] between the positions of the fireman and
the victim. Specifically, this probability is calculated by a function that
returns value that decreases linearly as the distance increases.
Similarly, the probability of saving the fireman life is calculated considering the
Manhattan distance [32] between the positions of the fireman and the door.
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7.3. Experiment
The main goal of the experiments that we have performed is to determine
whether the use of the n-BDI architecture to implement the fireman agent im-
proves its performance in a wide-range of situations. With this aim we per-
formed simulations in which the different parameters of the grids (i.e., their
size, the number of victims and the size of the door) are changed. Next, we
compare the results obtained by the three implementations.
7.3.1. Experiment Metrics
There are two main factors that determine the success of a fire-rescue: the
percentage of victims that are rescued and the survival of the fireman.
A simulation is represented as a set (G,D, V,R, F ), where: G is the size of
the grid; D is the door size; V is the total number of victims; R is the number of
victims that have been rescued; and F takes value 1 when the fireman survives
to the fire-rescue operation, otherwise it takes value 0.
The victim survival percentage achieved in a single simulation (G,D, V,R, F )
is defined as:
R
fMaxRescuedV ictims(G,D, V )
where fMaxRescuedV ictims is a function such that for each grid size, door size and
number of victims returns the maximum number of victims that can be rescued
on average23. Given a set of simulations (N = {(G1, D1, V1, R1, Fi), ..., (GN , DN ,
VN , RN , Fn)}) the victim survival percentage (SV ) is defined as:
SV (N ) =
N∑
i=1
Ri
fMaxRescuedV ictims(Gi, Di, Vi)
N
× 100
The fireman survival percentage achieved in a set of simulationsN = {(G1, D1,
V1, R1, Fi), ..., (GN , DN , VN , RN , FN )} is defined as:
SF (N ) =
N∑
i=1
Fi
N
× 100
We define the success (S) of a set of simulations as a product between the
values calculated by SV and SF for this simulation set.
Threshold Estimation. To determine which are the most suitable values for the
risk threshold and the compliance threshold, we have performed a set of sim-
ulations varying the value of these thresholds. In each simulation, a fireman
(norm-constrained or n-BDI) is allocated in a grid. The size of these grids (G)
23To estimate the values returned by this function we have performed a set of simulations
of the non-normative fireman.
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ranges randomly within the [3, 10] interval. The size of the door (D) ranges
randomly within the [1, G] interval. The number of victims (V ) ranges within
the [1, (G−1)
2
2 ] interval. For each value of the thresholds we have performed 1000
simulations. Figure 3 shows the success (S) obtained by norm-constrained fire-
man with respect to the value of the risk threshold. As illustrated by this figure,
the best result is obtained when the risk threshold is set to 0.31. Figure 4 shows
the success (S) obtained by n-BDI fireman24 with respect to the value of the
compliance threshold. As illustrated by this figure, the best result is obtained
by n-BDI fireman when the compliance threshold is set to 0.08. Therefore, in
the rest of experiments we have fixed the thresholds to these two values.
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Figure 3: Success obtained by norm-constrained fireman with respect to the risk threshold.
The X-axis represents the risk threshold and the Y-axis represents the success (S).
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Figure 4: Success obtained by n-BDI fireman with respect to the compliance threshold. The
X-axis represents the compliance threshold and the Y-axis represents the success (S).
24Note that in this experiment both desSurvive and desSaveV ictims have been set to 1.
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7.3.2. Experiment Description
We have performed different simulations for comparing the results obtained
by the three types of fireman. In the n-BDI architecture, the specific values given
to the desSurvive and desSaveV ictims parameters determine the personality
of the fireman. In this experiment, we consider three different personalities:
• Empathetic fireman, which wants to preserve victims’ life as much as it
wants to preserve its own life. Therefore, both desSurvive and desSaveV ictims
have been set to 1.0.
• Coward fireman, which wants to preserve victims’ life less than it wants to
preserve its own life. Therefore, desSurvive = 1 and desSaveV ictims =
0.5.
• Brave fireman, which wants to preserve victims’ life more than it wants to
preserve its own life. Therefore, desSurvive = 0.5 and desSaveV ictims =
1.0.
Therefore, we have experimented with 5 types of fireman; non-normative fire-
man, norm-constrained fireman, empathetic fireman, coward fireman and brave
fireman.
In each simulation the size of the grid (G) ranges within the [3, 10] interval,
the size of the door (D) ranges within the [1, G] interval and the number of
victims (V ) ranges within the [1, (G−1)
2
2 ] interval. For each value of G, D and
V we have performed 1000 different simulations to support the findings.
7.3.3. Experiment Results
Table 2 shows the results obtained by the simulations.
Fireman Implementation SV SF S
Non-Normative 99.96± 0.04% 22.49± 0.64% 22.48± 0.64%
Norm-Constrained 80.95± 1.26% 79.16± 0.89% 63.14± 1.14%
Empathetic n-BDI 87.83± 0.43% 76.8± 0.86% 66.76± 0.62%
Coward n-BDI 84.22± 0.56% 79.8± 0.87% 66.17± 0.57%
Brave n-BDI 99.87± 0.05% 36.46± 0.76% 36.41± 0.76%
Table 2: 95% confidence interval for the victim survival percentage (SV), the fireman survival
percentage (SF) and the success (S) that each implementation achieves.
As one could expect, the non-normative fireman is able to rescue almost all
the victims that can be rescued, since the fireman does not abort the fire-rescue
ever. However, the fireman survival is very low. Therefore, the lowest success
is obtained by the non-normative fireman.
In case of the norm-constrained fireman, it achieves better results since the
fireman survival percentage is significantly higher than the non-normative fire-
man, whereas the victim survival percentage decreases in a lesser degree. The
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confidence intervals in case of the norm-constrained fireman are the largest.
Hence, the behaviour exhibited by the norm-constrained fireman is more vari-
able: i.e., the results obtained change from rescue to rescue which implies that
the norm-constrained fireman has some difficulties to adapt to different rescue
operations.
The empathetic n-BDI fireman is more altruistic than norm-constrained fire-
man and the victim survival percentage (SV ) increases. Moreover, is survival
is lightly lower. As a consequence, a higher success is obtained by empathetic
fireman.
The coward n-BDI firemean wants to preserve victims’ life less than it wants
to preserve its own life. As a consequence, the fireman survival percentage
(SF ) increases. Since the coward fireman takes less risks, then the number of
rescued victims decreases lightly. As a consequence, the success that is obtained
by the coward fireman is similar to the empathetic fireman. Moreover, we can
observe that the coward fireman obtains a fireman survival percentage similar to
the norm-constrained fireman, while it obtains better results in terms of victim
survival. Thus, the n-BDI architecture can be used to model an improved
version of the norm-constrained fireman.
Finally, the brave n-BDI fireman wants to preserve victims’ life more than it
wants to preserve its own life. As a consequence, the victim survival percentage
(SV ) increases. However, the brave fireman takes more risks and its survival de-
creases notably. As a consequence, the success obtained by the brave fireman is
lower than the other n-BDI fireman. Nonetheless, we can observe that the brave
fireman is able to rescue a percentage of victims similar to the non-normative,
while it obtains better results in terms of fireman survival. Thus, the n-BDI
architecture can be used to model an improved version of the non-normative
fireman.
In general, empathetic and coward n-BDI firemen achieve a small improve-
ment with respect to the norm-constrained fireman (e.g., success in empathetic
fireman improves a 5.73%). This small improvement is due to the fact that only
one fireman participates in the fire-rescue operation. If more firemen partici-
pated, more victims would be rescued and the difference between the results
achieved by n-BDI firemen and norm-constrained firemen would also increase25.
As the experimental results illustrate, the use of the n-BDI architecture
allows a more dynamic behaviour to be modelled. Specifically, we have demon-
strated that due to the expressive and flexible rules used to reason about norms
n-BDI agents achieve a better adaptation to dynamic environments by making
more reasoned decisions about when a norm should be complied or violated.
n-BDI agents are capable of self-adjusting their behaviour to the features of
the fire-rescue operation in which they are involved. Moreover, different agent
personalities can be modelled. Thereby, the behaviour of agents is predictable
25The use of several firemen leads us to the problem of coordinating teams of firemen which
is out of the scope of this paper. For this reason, we have carried experiments in which only
one fireman participates.
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to some degree and MAS designers can decide the behaviour of the agents ac-
cording to the functionality that is required.
8. Related Work
The first proposal that defined a norm-autonomous agent as an agent whose
behaviour is influenced by norms that are explicitly represented inside its mind
was made by Conte et al. in [17]. Conte et al. also stated that norm- au-
tonomous agents have capabilities for acquiring norms, accepting a recognized
norm, determining whether a norm concerns their case, and making decisions
about norm compliance. From that moment on, several proposals on norm-
autonomous agents have been made. For example, Castelfranchi et al. in [14]
described how an agent architecture can be extended with an explicit norm
notion. Similarly, Dignum et al. proposed in [21] an extension of the classic
BDI architecture for considering norms. These first proposals provide intuitive
ideas and recommendations to meet the main requirements to norm-autonomous
agents. However, the authors did not specify a solution to meet these require-
ments. The work of Boella & Lesmo in [8], was one of the first proposals on the
MAS field that provided a solution to the autonomous decision on norm com-
pliance. Specifically, the authors provided some strategies for making a decision
about norm compliance. However, they did not provide enough details about
how agent programmers can develop norm-autonomous agents that implement
these strategies.
More recent works have also confronted with the problem of how agents
reason about norms. Specifically, this problem has been faced from a logical
and formal perspective, e.g., the proposals contained in [27, 34] describe logic
formalisms and axioms for representing norms. Besides that, there are proposals
on the development of agent architectures that provide means to software agents
to take norms into account in their practical reasoning; i.e., proposals on the
development of algorithms and procedures for allowing agents to decide the next
action to be executed according to norms. Given that our proposal falls into
this last category, this section reviews the most relevant architectures for norm-
autonomous agents. These architectures have been classified into norm-oriented
or goal-oriented according to the priority that agents give to norms with respect
to their internal goals.
8.1. Norm-oriented Agents
The main purpose of norm-oriented agents is to always observe norms, even
if this implies that they are unable to achieve their internal goals. An exam-
ple of norm-oriented agent architecture is the noA architecture [31], which is a
practical agent architecture with an explicit notion of obligation and prohibi-
tion. noA agents are not endowed with capabilities for acquiring norms and, as
a consequence, the norms that the agent take into account are a priori defined.
Basically, noA agents determine which norms are relevant to the agent at a given
moment. As in our proposal, norms have activation and expiration conditions
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define when norms become relevant. However, the noA proposal assumes that
agents are able to perceive and act upon a certain environment. Another exam-
ple of norm-oriented agent are Normative KGP agents, which are described in
[42]. This proposal consists of extending KGP (Knowledge-Goal-Plan) agents
[30] with explicit normative notions such as obligations, prohibitions, and roles.
Thus, norms define which are the responsibilities of a specific set of agents which
are playing a given role. As in our proposal, KGP agents consider as relevant
all norms that affect the roles being played by them.
As previously mentioned norm-oriented agents always try to fulfil norms.
Thus, they assume that the best course of action in any case is to follow norms.
This assumption may be valid for static environments. In dynamic environments
the circumstances may change drastically making norms to loose their validity.
Therefore, agents situated in this type of scenarios require more elaborated
processes for reasoning about norms (i.e., acquiring norms, accepting norms
and making decisions about norm compliance).
8.2. Goal-Oriented Agents
In contrast, goal-oriented normative agents always seek to achieve their de-
sires, fulfilling norms whenever possible.
BOID. In [10], Broersen et al. propose the extension of the BDI architecture
with an explicit notion of obligation. This is one of the first proposals on norm-
autonomous agents that describes how these agents (known as BOID) can be
designed in practise. Thus, BOID agents are formed by four components that
are associated with Beliefs, Obligations, Intentions and Desires. Obligations are
the external motivations of agents and their validity is taken for granted. In
this proposal, agents can violate norms only due to a conflict among obligations,
desires or intentions. This type of conflicts is solved by means of a static ordering
function that resolves conflicts between components and within components. In
contrast to our proposal, BOID agents always follow a rigid protocol for making
decisions about norm compliance; i.e., they cannot decide to follow or not a
given norm according to their circumstances.
Lo´pez y Lo´pez’s Proposal. One of the first proposals on goal-oriented agents
that have explicitly considered the current circumstances of agents for making
decisions regarding norms is made by Lo´pez y Lo´pez’s et al. in [33]. Specifically,
this work proposes methods for agents that are autonomous to come to decisions
about norms. The main drawbacks of this proposal are: (i) norm compliance
is only based on the existence of an external mechanism of norm enforcement
and , as a consequence, in absence of information about the enforcement mech-
anisms agents have no motivation to comply with norms; and (ii) it assumes
that agents are situated in a certain and deterministic environment, therefore
agents make decisions about norms upon certain and perfect knowledge about
the environment. In practice, agents interact by means of sensors and actuators
under uncertainty with a non-deterministic environment. Therefore, even Lo´pez
y Lo´pez proposal is unsuitable to be applied in real applications. In response
to this problem we have developed the n-BDI architecture.
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EMIL. In all of the aforementioned proposals, either norms are hard-coded on
agents off-line or agents are informed by authorities about norms on-line. There-
fore, agents are not capable of learning new norms on-line and adapting their
behaviours according to these unforeseen norms. To address this, the EMIL pro-
posal [3] developed a framework for autonomous norm recognition. Thus, agents
would be able to acquire new norms by observing the behaviour of other agents
that are located in their environments. EMIL agents make decisions about
norm by means of static utility functions that calculate the expected outcomes
of compiling with norms. This solution is suitable for controlled environments
in which agents confront with foreseeable situations. However, the kind of sce-
narios addressed in this paper, which are dynamic environments characterized
by uncertainty, require more flexible solutions to the norm compliance dilemma.
As stated in [14] “if protocols that agents use to react to the environment are
fixed, they have no ways to respond to unpredictable changes”.
Although several proposals have been made to define norm-autonomous
agents [13], the definition of an agent architecture for norm-autonomous agents
that have a physical presence in a real word environment remains unsolved. All
these proposals assume that agents are situated in a certain and determinis-
tic environment. Thus, these proposals define static procedures for reasoning
about norms such as blind obedience to norms, static utility functions, or static
priority orders. For example, the BOID architecture [10] defines a static prior-
ity order among mental attitudes that is programmed on agents. These static
mechanisms entail a limitation on the agent capacities for adapting to new so-
cieties or to the environmental changes. Only the proposal of Lo´pez y Lo´pez
et al., defined mechanisms for allowing agents to reason about norms accord-
ing to current circumstances of the agent. However, Lo´pez y Lo´pez assumed
that agents are situated within a certain environment that can be perceived by
agents with complete precision. The added value of our proposal with respect
to the existing literature is that our agents have been designed to achieve a
better adaptation to dynamic environments under uncertainty. To this aim n-
BDI agents are able to represent the uncertainty of the environment explicitly,
which implies that the norm reasoning process is more fine-grained. We defined
n-BDI agents using declarative procedures for norm reasoning and empirically
proved that they perform better than more static approaches when dealing with
uncertainty within dynamic environments.
9. Conclusions
Uncertainty is one of the most important problems when agents have a physi-
cal presence in some real-world environment. However, uncertainty has received
little attention in the existing literature on norm-autonomous agents. To ad-
dress this problem, we propose the n-BDI architecture in this paper. n-BDI
agents are able to represent the uncertainty about the environment. Moreover,
we have endowed them with declarative procedures that allow them to repre-
sent the norms that are in force in their environment, to accept them, to detect
which ones are relevant at a given moment and to make a decision about norm
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compliance. The main goal of the n-BDI architecture is to model agents that are
able to reason about norms while being able to adapt to dynamic environments
under uncertainty. To evaluate the n-BDI architecture, we have implemented
a simulator of a fire-rescue case study. Specifically, we have modelled the be-
haviour of the fireman that participates in a fire-rescue following three different
approaches: ignoring norms, implementing norms using static procedures and
using the n-BDI architecture to implement firemen agents. As the experimental
results illustrate, the fact that agents have more expressive procedures for rea-
soning about norms allows them to better adapt under uncertainty to a dynamic
environment. Specifically, we have demonstrated that n-BDI agents are capable
of self-adjusting their behaviour to the features of the fire-rescue operation in
which they are involved.
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